ML-DSA-87
Post-quantum signatures
SSX360 has adopted ML-DSA-87 for Matrix Scroll protocol v2. Signatures let reviewers check the integrity of signed material against the expected public key.
CYBERSECURITY / SIGNED EVIDENCE
Cybersecurity for
mission systems.
Security assessments, post-quantum signatures, and records your reviewers can verify offline. Each engagement defines the systems, authorization, methods, and evidence required for review.
01 / SIGNATURES & TRUST
Signed records.
Independent review.
Matrix Scroll protocol v2 connects the signature, the record format, and the rules for trusting a signer. Each has a distinct role in the evidence your team reviews.
COSE + JCS
Defined signed bytes
Protocol v2 specifies the bytes covered by a signature using COSE and canonical JSON. Reviewers can check the same record representation across implementations.
SHA-384
Record commitments
SHA-384 record commitments support checking the record content. Signature verification and signer authorization remain separate review steps.
PY / RS / JS
Offline verification
Verifier implementations in Python, Rust, and JavaScript let reviewers check signed material offline using the expected public key and trust policy.
TRUST POLICY
Explicit signer enrollment
The trust policy identifies which signers are authorized for the review. A valid signature is assessed alongside the signer’s authority, source quality, and scope.
ML-DSA is a digital-signature standard specified in FIPS 204. SSX360’s algorithm choice is separate from product certification or cryptographic-module validation.
Read the signature standard02 / SCOPED SECURITY ENGAGEMENTS
Assessment for your operating environment
Set the assessment around your control systems, communications, and assurance requirements. Agree the testing boundaries and expected evidence before work begins.
Examine the connected site.
Define the control systems, interfaces, access paths, and operational constraints. Agree the scope before active testing begins.
- Authorized penetration testing
- Communications and telemetry integrity
- Machine-authorization review
- Signed findings and evidence
Assess hardware and software.
Connect instrument-backed observations, cryptographic provenance, and migration planning to the system your team needs to evaluate.
- EM and RF characterization
- Entropy-source assessment
- Software provenance
- Post-quantum signature inventory
Evaluating a counter-UAS system or a shared critical site?
Explore airspace & infrastructure03 / ACCOUNTABLE EVIDENCE PLANE
From assessment
to a reviewable record.
Accountable Evidence Plane connects assessment work with signed records and offline verification. Define the systems, authorization, evidence period, and review criteria before work begins.
- 01 / DEFINE
Agree the boundary.
Document the systems in scope, written authorization, operating constraints, and the questions the assessment should answer.
- 02 / RECORD
Preserve the context.
Deliver findings with the methods, observations, and limitations needed to interpret them. Include signed records where agreed in the engagement.
- 03 / VERIFY
Check the evidence.
Review the signed material with the verifier, expected public key, and trust policy. Assess the findings against the original scope and source quality.
04 / PROTOCOL & RELATED WORK
Open software and related development
Matrix Scroll
Matrix Scroll remains open software under Apache-2.0. Protocol v2 candidate 0.11.0 is in code-owner review.
SIGNET PNT-1
The PNT-1 field-unit design applies signed integrity records to positioning, navigation, and timing. Hardware testing and performance validation remain part of the development plan.
Explore SIGNET methodsN.3.X.U.S OS
Hardware interfaces, perception, application logic, field communications, and evidence requirements within one architecture.
Explore N.3.X.U.S OSDefine your next assessment.
Share the operating context and review questions. Methods, deliverables, and acceptance criteria are agreed for each engagement.